Democrats are running around for anti-Trump narratives and discover a word: “oligarch.” It’s part of Joe Biden’s farewell address; it’s crucial for Senator Bernie Sanders’ Barnstorming; it appears in advice from former Obama’s hands. It aspires to fold together President Trump’s self-indoctrination, the image of Elon Musk’s huge influence, Silicon Valley’s big lens, and with familiar Democratic criticism of Republican parties as super-partisans.
I don’t want to make premature judgments about its rhetorical validity. But as a practical understanding of the narrative of the second Trump administration, the language of the “oligarch” masks more than it reveals. It hints at the vision of billionaires and big companies calling the lens. Of course, some of the promises of familiar Republican agenda items such as deregulation and tax cuts fit into the script.
But in the context of Trump’s most destructive and controversial policies, most of what people call American oligarchs are indifferent, skeptical or strongly opposed.
The first thing is to do is to carry out the crusade against beatings and DEI, a struggle that goes beyond the federal bureaucracy and is affected by federal funding (state policymaking, university recruitment). Is this a central oligarch agenda item? Not exactly. Of course, some companies’ currencies are bored with activists’ demands and welcome the right-hand turn. But before the uprising started by politicians like Ron DeSantis and activists like Christopher Rufo, the oligarchs of the company were great ally or agents, either accepting the restrictions of new progressivism, accepting the price of doing business, or actively encouraging Dei as a manager and business strategy.
In other words, capital is flexible. It can be awakened or unwelcome, depending on the prevailing wind, and if the opposition disappears, it will adapt again.
Next, consider what Musk calls government efficiency departments to cut government agencies’ crazy search for contracts, grants and head counts. Is this an oligarch? There is no doubt that some companies are ready to fill the space left by public sector retreats. But the entire U.S. corporate sector has deeply integrated into public-private partnerships, accustomed to comfortable lobbying relationships, and is eager to capitalize on the government’s power.
So, there is no deep corporate investment in reducing the number of heads of random federal agencies, and what the meaning of transferring these companies across Washington is as to what Doge might mean for a particular kind of private sector power.
Even with Musk himself, the first oligarch: Despite all the ways he might use his access to the game, the direct effects of his Crusades have been destroying Tesla, his most important company, and greatly reducing his (yes, still world net worth) net worth. (The risk of his position if the Republican loses power even more remarkable.) So when he is like a liberal or a debt crisis, we should at least take him some seriousness; he puts his net worth into the service of these ideas, not just using his ability to increase his wealth.
Finally, populist ideas rather than the self-interest of the oligarchs are clearly an incentive for Trump’s highest risk move, namely an excellent tariff experiment. Sure, there is a tycoon who can benefit from protectionism somewhere, but the generalization remains: No one wants this when it comes to the House of Lords of the U.S. economy.
Those who want it are a version of rights to critics of neoliberalism, who influenced Biden’s administration: outsiders’ intellectuals and opposition members of officials who see themselves as advocates of downgraded constituencies designed to benefit investors, businesses and billionaires. Trump has not followed the promise of populism in various ways, but the vision of a new trade order is the truest form of populism. It rejects the consensus shared by academic experts and the upper class and promises to bring long-term benefits to workers in exchange for short-term suffering from wealthy investors.
So it doesn’t really fit the line that Sanders or any left-wing Democrats prefer. This is not a giveaway from Trump’s biggest donor. (They hate it.) This is not Soto of Wall Street players. (They object to it.) This is not a reinforcement of neoliberal capitalism, but a rejection of its premise.
Instead, the opportunities it offers for Democrats, such as those provided by Biden in neoliberalism, depend on its actual economic impact. The future of the economy, even if Muskian cuts lead to fouls that led to popular government plans, provides the clearest way for the Democrats. But they will not lead the revolution against the oligarchs. They will promise a repair.
