Israeli military investigation confirmed Hamas The deadliest terrorist attacks in Israeli history on October 7, 2023, were able to carry out the deadliest terrorist attacks in Israeli history as the more powerful Israeli army misjudged the intentions of militant groups and underestimated their capabilities.
“A large-scale surprise attack is not a possibility due to basic misunderstandings about the enemy,” the military said in a summary of the findings released on Thursday. “The IDF and intelligence agencies consider Hamas a limited and reactive threat and believe that early warnings will be ahead of any large-scale offensive.”
These findings could force Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a broader investigation to study political decisions ahead of the terrorist attacks, which triggered the terrorist attack. The Gaza War.
The Prime Minister has not been responsible for Israel’s strategy in the years after the attack, saying he only answered tough questions after the war, a tough six weeks Ceasefire. Despite public pressure, including about 1,200 families and 251 killed hostages in the October 7 attack, Netanyahu refused to call for an inquiry committee.
The military’s main discovery was that the region’s most powerful and complex military misread Hamas’ intentions, underestimated its capabilities, and that the surprise attacks of thousands of militants in the early morning of the Great Jewish holiday were completely unprepared.
Jack Guez/AFP via Getty Images
Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi shared with the media on Thursday in a comment on the military commander on Monday.
“I am the commander of the army on October 7, and I have my own responsibilities. I also bear the weight of all your responsibilities – I also think I am mine.”
The military’s findings are consistent with past conclusions from officials and analysts. The military released only a summary of the report, and military officials outlined its findings.
“October 7 was a complete failure,” a military official told the Associated Press that he told the regulations on anonymous condition.
The investigation found that Hamas, who controlled Gaza from Palestinian authorities in 2007, was more interested in ruling the territory than fighting Israel.
The military also misjudged Hamas’ capabilities, which have long been designated by the U.S. and Israeli governments. Military planners believe that the worst thing is that Hamas can conduct ground invasions from up to eight borders, military officials told the Associated Press. In fact, Hamas has more than 60 attack routes.
The official told the Associated Press that intelligence assessed after the attack indicated that Hamas had launched an offensive almost on earlier occasions but delayed the offensive for unknown reasons.
The official also said there were signs that something was wrong in the hours before the attack, including when the Hamas fighters swapped their phones for Israeli networks.
The view that Hamas does not want war to guide policymakers to act that could thwart attacks.
“It is believed that Hamas may be under pressure to reduce the motivation for war, mainly by improving living conditions in the Gaza Strip,” the report summary said. “Israel’s policy on Gaza is based on defense, stabilization and prevention of Hamas’ military accumulation, preparing for direct conflict (i.e., era) preparation efforts, and preparing for escalating situations.”
Israeli military officials told the Associated Press that intelligence shows that the mastermind of the October 7 attack, Yahya Sinwar, was Killed in October last yearstarted planning as early as 2017.
On a holiday weekend, Hamas launched a large number of rockets while the army was caught off guard, causing thousands of fighter jets to explode on safety fences or fly over it on suspension gliders. They knocked down surveillance cameras and quickly flooded hundreds of soldiers along the border.
From there, they headed to the main highway intersection and attacked the area, including some senior officials, undermining military command and control, according to a second military official.
In the first three hours after the attack, Hamas fighters plundered border communities and music festivals with little resistance. That was when most of the 251 hostages were killed, the official told the Associated Press. The official said the chaos led to a friendly firefighting incident, although he said few people did not disclose the numbers.
It took the military several hours to regain control until the area completely eliminated militants.
According to the first official, the report accused the military of overconfidence in its knowledge and not showing enough suspicion in its core concepts and beliefs. A key lesson, the summary says, is that Israel cannot develop threats on its borders.
It articulates several recommendations, including the creation of special units designed to prepare for such surprises and large-scale events, and reforms to the military intelligence sector, which will promote “openness, doubt, listen, learn, learn.”
It does not blame any soldier or officer, but it is likely to pave the way for military and ultimately dismissal.
Some senior officers outside Harlevi also resigned, including former head of military intelligence.
